

Die nordische Außenpolitik in der Zeit zwischen 1410 und 1423 war keine Neuerfindung Margarethes oder Erichs. Sie war vielmehr eine Fortsetzung der Linie, die schon unter Erich Menved und Valdemar Atterdag von Dänemark verfolgt worden war. Für Dänemark galt es, wirtschaftsstrategisch wichtige Positionen im Ostseeraum einzunehmen und zu verteidigen. Hierzu gehörte auch das Herzogtum Estland. Diese Kontinuität der dänischen Außenpolitik wurde bisher in der Forschung weitestgehend übersehen, wodurch der Eindruck entstand, die Estlandfrage sei in der Zeit Erichs aus der Luft gegriffen worden. Dieses ist aber durchaus falsch. Die Politik Margarethes und Erichs ist als Fortsetzung der traditionellen dänischen Außenpolitik seit dem Beginn des 13. Jahrhunderts anzusehen.⁹⁶

SUMMARY

The Union of Calmar and the Teutonic Order 1410–1423: The Question of Estonia

In 2010 it will be 600 years since the Teutonic Order was defeated by Poland-Lithuania in the Battle of Tannenberg. It was in many ways a historical turning point. The defeat also made it possible for Queen Margaret I and Eric of Pomerania as leaders of the Union of Calmar to re-launch the foreign policy of Denmark and Sweden in the Baltic Sea region. The chief aim of this policy was to gain control of the trade in the Baltic Sea. In their foreign policies Margaret I and Eric of Pomerania used different methods to gain this goal.

Queen Margaret I used the Duchy of Estonia as a starting point. The duchy had been sold to the Teutonic Order in 1346, but after the Battle of Tannenberg Margaret intervened in the domestic politics of Livonia, where she supported the nobility against the Teutonic Knights. Thereby she had the possibility of gaining a toehold in the backyard of the lands of the Teutonic Order. But she went even further and demanded the return of the duchy. Although weak, the Order refused this demand. The grandmasters had stabilized the Order after the defeat and did not want to lose the duchy.

⁹⁶ Nur Gottfried Carlsson hat sich zum Fürsprecher dieses Aspekts gemacht, wobei er allerdings Erich von Pommern die Rolle eines Vordenkers des *Dominium Maris Baltici*-Gedankens zusprach. Wie gezeigt werden konnte, war Erichs Politik keine Neuschöpfung, sondern nur die Fortsetzung alter Gedankenspiele. GOTTFRIED CARLSSON: Sveriges historia [Geschichte Schwedens], Bd. 3/1, Stockholm 1941, S. 155, 204. Thomas Riis kam in seinen Arbeiten zu einem ähnlichen Ergebnis. RIIS, Der polnisch-dänische Vertrag (wie Anm. 10), S. 67-78.

The situation was however very serious for the Order since the queen and later Eric of Pomerania also cooperated with Poland-Lithuania, especially in 1415–1416 and 1418–1420. In 1419 Eric made an alliance with Poland-Lithuania with the aim of starting a war against the Order, so that Eric finally could conquer the Duchy of Estonia and thereby gain control of the trade in the Baltic Sea. However, the war failed to materialize, and Poland-Lithuania abandoned its Baltic policy for a longer period.

Since the political partnership with Poland-Lithuania did not result in war against the Teutonic Knights, Eric once more tried to intervene in the domestic politics of Livonia, but this time he not only sought the support of the nobility, but also of the clergy. This was however very complicated, since these two groups were not capable of cooperation. The Order was far more experienced in these affairs, so Eric's Estonian policy was doomed to fail.

In 1423 Eric therefore chose to ally himself to the Order and thereby abandoned his Estonian policy in order to use all his resources to solve the question of Schleswig in the best way he saw fit. Though, both Queen Margaret I and Eric of Pomerania re-launched the foreign policies of Denmark and Sweden in the Baltic Sea region, they largely failed because the Union of Calmar could never use all of its resources on the eastern Baltic region, since the question of Schleswig dominated Danish foreign policy during the same period and remained largely unresolved.